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The endogeneity of prices has long been recognized as the main identification problem in the estimation of
marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the characteristics of a given product. This issue is particularly
important in the housing market, since a number of housing and neighborhood features are unobserved by
the econometrician. This paper proposes the use of a well defined type of transaction costs–moving costs
generated by property tax laws–to deal with this type of omitted variable bias. California's Proposition 13
property tax law is the source of variation in transaction costs used in the empirical analysis. Beyond its fiscal
consequences, Proposition 13 created a lock-in effect on housing choice because of the implicit tax break
enjoyed by homeowners living in the same house for a long time. Its importance to homeowners is estimated
from a natural experiment created by two amendments that allow households headed by an individual over
the age of 55 to transfer the implicit tax benefit to a new home. Indeed, 55-year old homeowners have 25%
higher moving rates than those of comparable 54 year olds. These transaction costs from the property tax laws
are then incorporated into a household sorting model. The key insight is that because of the property tax laws,
different potential buyers may have different user costs for the same house. The exogenous property tax
component of this user cost is then used as an instrumental variable. I find that MWTP estimates for housing
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Abstract
The endogeneity of prices has long been recognized as the main identification problem in the
estimation of marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for the characteristics of a given product. This issue
is particularly important when estimating MWTP in the housing market, since a number of housing and
neighborhood features are unobserved by the econometrician. This paper proposes the use of a well
defined type of transaction costs – moving costs generated by property tax laws - to deal with this type
of omitted variable bias. California’s Proposition 13 property tax law is the source of variation in
transaction costs used in the empirical analysis. Beyond its fiscal consequences, Proposition 13 created
a lock-in effect on housing choice because of the implicit tax break enjoyed by homeowners living in
the same house for a long time. First, I provide estimates of this lock-in effect using a natural
experiment created by two subsequent amendments to Proposition 13 - Propositions 60 and 90. These
amendments allow households headed by an individual over the age of 55 to transfer the implicit tax
benefit to a new home. I show that mobility rates of 55-year old homeowners are approximately 25%
higher than those of 54 year olds. Second, all these features of the tax law are then incorporated into
a household sorting model. The key insight of this model is that because of the property tax law,
different potential buyers have different user costs for the same house. The exogenous property tax
component of this user cost then works as an instrument for prices. I find that MWTP estimates for
housing characteristics are approximately 100% upward biased when the model does not account for
the price endogeneity. 
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I. Introduction 
Household sorting in the urban housing market has attracted the attention of economists 
since the pioneering work of Tiebout (1956).1  Empirical research on local public finance, school 
choice, and segregation patterns, for example, have applied equilibrium sorting concepts 
originated in this literature.2  In spite of its elegance, however, some of the Tiebout assumptions 
may not be credible, such as the free mobility of households.  In reality, transaction costs and 
other barriers to sorting systematically affect individual behavior, although it is a difficult task to 
precisely measure those costs.3 
In this paper I study the impact of one type of transaction costs – moving costs 
generated by property tax laws - on household mobility and how it can be used to recover 
preference parameters in a residential sorting model.  Estimation of marginal willingness to pay 
(MWTP) for housing and neighborhood amenities have been plagued by omitted variable bias, 
since finding a credible research design that accounts for the unobservable characteristics of a 
house is a daunting task.4  The key insight of the instrumental variable developed in this paper is 
that in states where property taxes are based on historical prices rather than current market 
values, potential house buyers have different user costs for the same property.  This research 
focuses on housing demand in California, where Proposition 13, passed in 1978, created 
unusually wide variation in property tax rates.  
Proposition 13 replaced a decentralized system of property tax rates around 2-3% of 
assessed house values, with a uniform 1% fixed rate, based on prices at the time of purchase.  
The immediate effect of Proposition 13 was a one-time reduction in local property tax 
revenues.5  The longer-run impact was to create a system of “grand-fathered” tax rates for 
houses based on historical prices.  The associated tax savings can be substantial: Considering the 
one quarter of San Francisco Bay Area families with more than 20 years of housing tenure in 
                                                 
1 Much of the intuition on household sorting was derived from a long line of theoretical work in local public finance 
that started in Tiebout (1956), and which includes Epple and Zelenitz (1981), Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 
1993), Benabou (1993), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Nechyba (1997) and Epple and Sieg (1999). 
2 Recent examples are found in Barrow and Rouse (2004), Rothstein (2006) and Bajari and Kahn (2005). 
3 As Rubinfeld (1987) points out “the value and usefulness of the Tiebout model is likely to diminish in the future, 
and an alternative or alternatives are needed.” Also, see Quigley (2001) for a survey about the different types of 
housing transaction costs. 
4 Instruments to control for the correlation between prices and unobserved housing quality are scarce in this 
literature.  Bajari and Kahn (2006), for example, estimate bounds on willingness to pay for distance to work in order 
to avoid the use of instruments, and Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) use an instrument derived from the choice 
model. 
5 Property tax revenues in California declined by 45% in 1978-1979, and the share of local counties’ revenue from 
property taxes declined from 33% in 1977-1978 to 11.6% in 1995-1996 – see Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982), Silva and 
Sonstelie (1995), Fischel (1989), and Brunner and Rueben (2001) for fiscal consequences of Proposition 13.  
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1990, I estimate that these savings amounted to an average of 4.5% of household gross annual 
income.  The grand-fathering of tax rates therefore creates a “lock-in” effect, since a homeowner 
who moves to another house may experience a large increase in tax liability.6  However, under a 
pair of propositions passed in the late 1980’s (Proposition 60 in 1986, and Proposition 90 in 
1988), homeowners aged 55 or older who sell a property and buy another of equal or lesser value 
are allowed to keep the tax base value of their original home.  These laws created a sharp 
discontinuity in the lock-in effect of Proposition 13, giving rise to an interesting natural 
experiment for estimating the impact of moving costs on mobility. 
I estimate the lock-in effect attributable to Proposition 13 by comparing householders 
who are 54 years old to those who are 55, in a typical Regression Discontinuity (RD) design.  I 
find that 55-year olds have a 1.2-1.5 percentage point higher rate of moving (on a base of 
approximately 4%).  Consistent with a tax-based explanation for this difference, 55-year old 
recent movers paid 15% less property taxes than their 54-year old counterparts.  To check 
whether this change in mobility is due to other discontinuous trends, I look at mobility rates for 
various control groups, including California homeowners in 1980 and renters in 1990, and Texas 
homeowners in 1990.  In all, I find no evidence of a discontinuity.  Moreover, there are no 
differences in property taxes paid by 54 and 55-year old recent movers for these control groups.  
Transaction costs due to Proposition 13 are then explicitly incorporated in a household 
location decision model.  The output from this revealed preference model consists of a set of 
underlying taste parameters for housing and neighborhood characteristics, which are of special 
interest for understanding sorting patterns and valuation of local public amenities.  Here I adopt 
estimation strategies first used by McFadden (1974 and 1978), and updated by Berry (1994), 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), and Petrin and Train (2006). 
The household sorting model developed in this paper has three distinct features.  First, it 
embeds a Regression Discontinuity design – given by the Proposition 13 amendments – within a 
structural model.  This is one of the first papers to use such a research design7, incorporating a 
reduced form identification strategy in a sorting model of the housing market, in order to 
account for the endogeneity of housing prices.  Second, instead of assuming that consumers face 
                                                 
6 These calculations are explained in Section II.  The Proposition 13 effect is analogous to the spatial lock-in related 
to falling housing prices, as in Caplin, Freeman and Tracy (1997) and Chan (2001), or due to increase in interest 
rates, as in Quigley (1987). 
7 Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf and Walsh (2004) looked at the implications of the Clean Air Act but did not derive a 
strategy for instrumenting based on that policy change.  Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) recently embedded 
boundary fixed effects in a sorting model to control for the correlation between school quality and unobserved 
neighborhood quality. 
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one fixed price for each house, Proposition 13 and its amendments naturally generate a specific 
user cost of the house to each homeowner.  Third, all estimates are based on micro-data, 
without using any type of calibration.  In fact, the implementation of this sorting model is only 
feasible using the 1990 California Decennial Census Long Form data, which is a 15% sample.  
These are restricted-access micro data, with information for approximately two million 
households in California, including the property taxes paid by each.  Unlike the publicly available 
micro sample, in which the smallest geographic area contains 100,000 individuals, the 15% 
sample reveals the location of each house and workplace at the Census block level, a region with 
approximately 100 individuals.  This special feature allows me to precisely define neighborhoods, 
and at the same time incorporate a rich set of observed heterogeneity, such as income, race, age 
and distance to work. 
Simple multinomial logit estimates of the sorting model generate a relatively small user 
cost coefficient, indicating very high preferences for certain housing characteristics.  This result 
is typical of an omitted variable bias situation: given that we do not observe all housing 
amenities, prices tend to be higher for houses with valuable unobserved attributes.  This 
problem can be solved by an RD design adapted to a control function approach8, in which 
differences in the tax cost across houses attributable to Proposition 13 and its amendments 
provide the exogenous variation to the user cost of the house. 
Preference parameter estimates from the adjusted model are then used to recover 
estimates of the MWTP for housing and neighborhood attributes.  I find that most MWTP 
estimates for housing and neighborhood characteristics are approximately 100% upward biased 
when not controlling for the endogeneity of housing prices.  For example, homeowners are 
willing to pay, on average, $1,562 for a neighborhood that has a marginal increase in the 
proportion of whites in a block group, compared to $2,985 of a simple logit model.  These 
results hold after the inclusion of heterogeneity and wealth effects.  Interestingly, the same 
estimation method breaks down when applied to Texas, given the lack of meaningful variation in 
property taxes for that state. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In Section II, I explain Proposition 13 in 
detail, and in Section III, I estimate the lock-in effect.  Section IV presents a household 
residential location model, and Section V provides estimates of MWTP for housing and 
neighborhood characteristics.  Section VI concludes. 
                                                 
8 The control function approach for discrete choice models was first proposed by Petrin and Train (2006). 
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 II. Proposition 13 
Proposition 13 was approved in 1978 by 65% of the voters in California.  The vote was 
widely interpreted as a “tax revolt” against the state government.  In the mid-1970’s, property 
tax revenues in California were quickly fueled by sky-rocketing house prices and the 
unwillingness of local officials to cut property tax rates in the face of a growing tax base.  
Advocates of the proposition argued that tax increases were forcing elderly and low-income 
families to sell their homes.  At the same time, school spending in the state was dramatically 
changing in response to the California Supreme Court’s decision, Serrano vs Priest (1971), which 
required the equalization of spending per pupil across school districts.  Fischel (1985) argues that 
the cost of the equalization program provoked a reaction by the voters in the form of restricting 
government revenues through Proposition 13.9 
According to the California Constitution, Article XIIIa, Proposition 13 states that “the 
maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of 
the full cash value of such property”.  Full cash value means price at the time of purchase plus a 
maximum inflation adjustment of 2 percent per year.  No re-assessment could be carried out, 
implying that property taxes are effectively frozen (apart from the 2% per year rise).  Also, the 
initial base values used to set property taxes were the assessed housing values of 1975/1976.10 
Table 1 compares the impact of Proposition 13 on effective tax rates (individual house 
values divided by property taxes) by the date when households moved into their home using the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 5% samples from 1980 and 1990 for the states 
of California and Texas.11  The choice of Texas as comparison group comes from the fact that 
house values are re-assessed every two to three years in that state.  A striking feature of these 
data is the gap in effective property taxes paid by homeowners of different tenures in California 
in 1990.  While homeowners who had moved in the previous year paid an effective tax rate of 
0.8% on average, households living in the same dwelling for more than a decade paid less than 
0.44%.  This discrepancy corresponds to a tax saving of $900 per year in 1990 dollars.  If we 
                                                 
9 Proposition 13’ effects still reverberate today, as recurrent state budget pressures lead to under funding of several 
public services.  Paul Krugman wrote in a New York Times editorial of 08/22/2003 “Thanks to Proposition 13, 
some people pay ridiculously low property taxes. Warren Buffett offered the perfect example: he pays $14,401 in 
property taxes on his $500,000 home in Omaha, but only $2,264 on his $4 million home in Orange County.” 
10 The law also says that the limitation of 1% of property taxes for all local governances would not apply to 
additional taxes to pay for specific bonds approved by a super-majority of voters.  Also, Proposition 13 required 
that any new taxes proposed by the state legislature had to be approved by a two-thirds majority of each house. 
11 Appendix Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for housing and homeowner characteristics. 
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focus on the implicit tax benefit – the difference between current property taxes and 1% of 
house values - for households who moved in before 1979, this number can reach almost 3% of 
household gross annual income.  In some places, such as the San Francisco Bay Area, the 
implicit tax benefit reached almost 4.5% of gross income for the same selected group of 
households. 
When looking at California in 1980, by comparison, we only see a small difference in 
effective property taxes between homeowners who moved before 1975 and those who moved 
after.  This is the initial consequence of Proposition 13, when property taxes were set at 1% of 
house values assessed in 1975.  As opposed to California, the Texas data show relatively stable 
effective property tax rates.  Only households who moved before 1970 have discounts in 
property taxes, presumably because Texas offers special exemptions for householders 65 years 
of age and older. 
Figure 1 plots effective property tax rates by age for California homeowners in 1990.  
The distributional effects of Proposition 13 are clear: elderly households pay less property tax 
than younger households, because of differences in tenure by age.  When normalizing property 
taxes by annual household income instead of house values (Figure 2) the distributional effects of 
Proposition 13 are less pronounced.  The main characteristic is that individuals between 50-60 
years of age pay less property tax as a proportion of their income compared to other age groups.  
This might reflect the age profile of income, where maximum income is generally achieved 
around age 50.  In comparing current taxes with a counterfactual 1% of housing values as 
property taxes, the gap between what Californians should pay in a different regime is much 
larger for the elderly. 
 
III. Lock-in Effect 
The lock-in effect of Proposition 13 arises because of the implicit tax break for 
households who have been living in the same house for a long time.  However, it is hard to 
identify the causal impact of Proposition 13 on mobility since the date you moved to a house is 
correlated with other unobserved factors that reduce mobility rates.  But two important 
modifications to the tax law that were enacted during the 1980’s – Proposition 60 and 
Proposition 90 - provide an interesting set up to estimate the impact of Proposition 13 on 
mobility. 
Proposition 60 was a constitutional amendment approved in 1986, which allowed the 
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transfer of tax benefits for within-county movers.  Proposition 60 permits a transfer of a 
Proposition 13 base year value of the property from the current residence to a replacement 
dwelling if: a) homeowners are at least 55 years old; and b) the replacement dwelling is of equal 
or lesser value than the selling price of the old property.  In practice, Proposition 60 enabled 55-
year or older households to carry the frozen property taxes to a new home within the same 
county.  Proposition 90, approved in 1988, resulted in even more flexibility, allowing inter-
county base year value transfers.  Adoption of Proposition 90 was not mandatory and the law 
only applies across counties that approved the ordinance.12 
I identify the impact of Proposition 13 on mobility by examining moving rates after the 
age 55, when the lock-in effect is removed.13 Figure 3 illustrates the key insight of the research 
design.  It graphs the probability of moving to a new house in 1990 by age group.  Each dot in 
Figure 3 is calculated as the total number of homeowners who moved in the last year, divided by 
the total number of homeowners from the respective age.14  Age is defined as the maximum age 
between householder and spouse, to correspond with the provisions of Propositions 60 and 90.  
A sharp discontinuity arises between 54 and 55-year olds.  The probability of moving for a 54-
year old is 4% while for 55 year olds it reaches 5.2%.  This 1.2% point difference is presumably 
caused by the effect of Propositions 60 and 90. 
The figure presented above is typical of a Regression Discontinuity design approach.  
Although the RD is not new – see Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960), Cook and Campbell 
(1979), and Angrist and Lavy (1999) – its different estimation approaches were only developed 
recently.  Hahn, Todd and Van der Klaauw (2001), for example, focused on identification and 
non parametric estimation of the RD when the discontinuity occurs on a continuous variable.  
Lee (2001) and Lee (2007) show that when the variable on which the discontinuity occurs is 
discrete, the RD can be estimated parametrically.  Because age is measured in years we use a 
parametric rather than a nonparametric approach.  The following third order polynomial 
equation for the probability of moving in 1990 is estimated: 
                                                 
12 Only a few, albeit relatively large, counties in California adopted Proposition 90 immediately after approval of the 
law, namely:  Alameda, Contra Costa, Inyo, Kern, Los Angeles, Marin, Modoc, Monterrey, Orange, Riverside, San 
Diego, San Mateo, Santa Clara, and Ventura.  60% of the state population is located in these counties.  Four of 
those counties have subsequently repealed the ordinance: Contra Costa, Inyo, Marin and Riverside. 
13 Few papers study the effects of Proposition 13 on mobility, such as Sexton, Sheffrin and O’Sullivan (1995) and 
(1999).  Nagy (1997) looks at mobility rates before and after the law approval, finding no significant effects (the 
lock-in effect could only have an impact after a significant house prices increase). 
14 The fitted line is generated from a set of predicted values from a polynomial regression explained below – see 
equation (1). 
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where  is a dummy for 55-year or older and 55iD ( )⋅Φ  is the normal c.d.f..  The age controls are 
included in the equation because the effect of age on mobility is non-linear.15 
Table 2 reports results from a probit model, designed to quantify the patterns observed 
in the figures above.  Column (1) shows a negative correlation between  and the probability 
of moving, due to the negative impact of age on mobility rates.  Column (3) adds the polynomial 
in age, leading to a change in the sign of the age 55 and older dummy, and setting the effect of 
 on mobility in 1.5% points.  The estimated parameter is unchanged with the addition of 
housing attributes, household characteristics or fixed effects at the metropolitan area - this result 
is typical of a regression discontinuity design: covariates should not matter around the threshold 
that defines a treatment and control groups. 
55
iD
55
iD
Pooling the 1990 California data with 1980 California data or the 1990 Texas data 
increases the estimated effect to 1.7% and 2% respectively, which is consistent with the 
downward trend in mobility rates observed in those control groups.  Finally, I exclude 54 to 55-
year households from the sample, in order to control for possible measurement errors in age.  
This test also verifies the existence of an overall effect in mobility patterns as opposed to only 
54-years homeowners delaying mobility until they are 55 years old.  The estimate of 1.4% 
confirms that Propositions 60 and 90 affected all homeowners older than 55.16 
These reduced form results hold for the local population of 54 and 55-year old, 
independent of their moving status.  Given the 1-year difference in both cohorts, there is no 
reason to expect differences in preferences or average characteristics of those households.  
Figure 4 confirms this result by plotting a set of house and neighborhood characteristics by age, 
which shows no evidence of a discontinuity between 54 and 55-year olds.  All comparisons 
above point out to a causal relationship between the ability to transfer the tax benefit and 
                                                 
15 Interactions of age with post age 55 are not included because there are not enough degrees of freedom by year – 
see Lee and Card (2005) for additional details. 
16 A remaining question relates to how permanent or transitory were the effects of Propositions 60 and 90.  Given 
that we are looking at mobility rates in 1989-1990, 3 years after Proposition 60’s approval and 1 year after 
Proposition 90, potentially these analyses capture mobility for a stock of households that were mismatched for 
some period of time and not only in the year period.  Although this is a relevant consideration, there is no evidence 
that homeowners were moving at higher rates to houses located in different counties because of Proposition 90 
(which was approved only 1 year before the period of analysis). 
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mobility rates.  The next subsection presents a variety of tests of this interpretation. 
 
A. Robustness Checks  
In order to rule out competing hypotheses, I compare 1990 California data with several 
control groups, such as California data from 1980, before Propositions 60 and 90 had been 
approved.  Figure 5 graphs the probability of moving for this group, where only the negative 
relationship between mobility and age is found.  This comparison rules out any type of special 
Californian mobility pattern as the explanation for the sharp change in mobility rates. 
Figure 6 plots the probability of moving for renters in California 1990. Again, no 
discontinuity is found for the relevant age group.  The existence of a 1989-1990 localized year 
effect on mobility is ruled out by this comparison.  Figure 7 plots the probability of moving for 
homeowners in Texas in 1990.  Again, no discontinuity is found, allowing me to rule out 
national economic shocks, regulations or trends as cause of the change in mobility rates for 55 
years old in California in 1990.17 
The Proposition 60 and Proposition 90 mechanism relates to the ability of transferring 
the tax benefit.  If recent movers in fact used Propositions 60 and 90, a discontinuity in property 
taxes payments would be expected.  We test it in Figure 8 by comparing average property taxes 
by age for three different samples.  The gap between 54 and 55 year old recent movers is 
approximately $220 per year, and is only noticeable in California in 1990.  Only a downward 
trend in property taxes payments is observed in California in 1980, and Texas in 1990.  It is 
worth noting that in Texas, 65 year of age or older households enjoy several exemptions in their 
tax payments.  Table 3 reports differences in effective property tax data estimated separately for 
recent movers and long tenure homeowners.  Those differences are only significant for recent 
movers in California, 1990.18 
The $220 per year gap in taxes between 54 and 55 year old Californians in 1990 seems a 
small number compared to the differences in property tax payments reported in Table 1.  If long 
tenure households were moving in 1989-1990 in similar proportions, i.e., “when moved in” 
                                                 
17 It is important to compare mobility rates with other states because the old capital gain laws also allowed 
homeowners 55-year or older to avoid certain payments under some conditions.  When comparing mobility rates 
for the state of Massachusetts, where house prices significantly increased in the 1980’s, there are also no differences 
in mobility rates between 54 and 55-year old homeowners.  For the effect of other tax reforms on housing demand 
see Sinai (1997). 
18 Differences in property taxes and effective tax rates in California in 1990 can only be used as a consistency check.  
Given that Figure 8 and Table 3do not report results for the overall population, any comparison between 54 and 55-
year olds would suffer from selection bias. 
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groups were contributing with proportional number of recent movers, the expected average gap 
would be $536 per year.19  This indicates that long tenure homeowners were probably moving 
with lower rates than short tenure homeowners.  Also, 55-year old homeowners moving to more 
expensive houses are not allowed to transfer the tax benefit. 
Families moving to counties that did not allow Proposition 90 are another explanation 
for the modest tax difference.  Figure 9 shows the probability of moving for California 1990 
split in two groups: movers who could transfer the tax benefit (because of Proposition 60 or 90) 
and movers who could not (because Proposition 90 was not allowed).  The comparison is made 
using the Census question: “Where did this person live 5 years ago (on April 1, 1985)?” 22% of 
the 54 and 55-year old recent homeowners moved to places that did not accept Proposition 90.  
The figure shows a close to zero impact on mobility for homeowners who could not transfer the 
tax benefit.20 
 
IV. Residential Location Decisions Model 
In this section I develop a household residential demand model, where taxation costs are 
included as a device to recover estimates of the marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for housing 
and neighborhood attributes.  The key insight of the model is that user cost for a similar house 
varies across homeowners.  The property tax differences created by Proposition 13 and its 
amendments provides exogenous variation in user costs, and the RD design can be adapted in a 
control function approach in order to reduce the influence of unobserved house characteristics 
in estimating MWTP. 
The model is based on standard differentiated product demand models, whose roots lie 
in the work of McFadden (1973,1978) and more recently Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and 
Pakes (1995), and Petrin and Train (2006).  The central idea is that demand parameters can be 
recovered from observed choices in the housing market, where houses are considered as bundles 
of characteristics.  Households choose to live in the house that maximizes expected utility 
derived from housing and location attributes. 
A number of existing studies have estimated preferences for housing and neighborhood 
                                                 
19 In order to estimate the full tax benefit, one would need to know the expected tenure for each homeowner, 
compare it with their expected future income (which is potentially decreasing given the proximity to retirement age), 
and then calculate present values. 
20 A final explanation is that some of the new movers may have been renters in the previous house.  For example, 
the proportion of 54-55 years old non-movers who are renters is 20% for California in 1990.  Also, from the March 
CPS question “What was (your/name) main reason for moving?” we can infer that 16.2% of the 50-59 years of age 
households pointed out “wanted to own home, not rent” as the main reason to move. 
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characteristics in other frameworks.  Palmquist (1984) directly estimated demand for certain 
house characteristics in seven metropolitan areas using the hedonic approach developed by 
Rosen (1974).  Recently, several papers adapted the discrete choice approach to the housing 
market, including Bajari and Kahn (2005), Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2004) and Bayer, 
Ferreira and McMillan (2007).  These last two papers develop an equilibrium model of the 
housing market, allowing the estimation of general equilibrium simulations to evaluate changes 
in policy.  None of these papers, however, explicitly takes into account the variation in user costs 
of alternative housing units posed by property tax laws or other types of transaction costs. 
 
A. The Model 
Assume that household i maximizes utility by choosing among alternative houses 
indexed by j.   Also, assume that housing supply is fixed.  The indirect utility of household i from 
consuming house j, );,,,,( θξτ jijijj zxpU , is defined as a function of housing prices , the 
property taxes paid by each homeowner 
jp
ijτ , a vector of housing amenities , a vector of 
observed household characteristics  - including annual household income , unobserved 
attributes of the house 
jx
iIiz
jξ  and a vector of unknown parameters θ  defining mean and 
heterogeneity in preferences.  I adopt the following functional form: 
 
(2) ijjijijiiij xpIgu εξβα +++−= )(  
 
where  is a monotonic function, )(⋅g ijε  is the stochastic term, and iα  and iβ  are preferences 
for housing prices and attributes.  Each parameter associated with the choice variables in the 
model varies with a household’s own characteristics according to: 
 
(3a)   ∑
=
+=
R
r
ri
m
ri z
1
0 ααα
(3b)   ∑
=
+=
R
r
ri
m
ri z
1
0 βββ
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and equations (3a) and (3b) describe household i’s preference for housing characteristic m.21  
The term ijp , which I call the user cost of the house in a given year, is defined as: 
 
(4) ijjij rpp τ+=  
 
where r is the annual interest rate.  The user cost of the house is composed by a common 
carrying cost  faced by all individuals, and property taxes jrp ijτ specific to each homeowner. 
Alternative choices for the function )(⋅g  determine whether there are income effects in 
the marginal willingness to pay for amenities.  The MWTP by household i for amenity j  is: 
 
(5) 
)(
1
ijii
m
i
ij
ij
m
j
ij
ij pIg
p
u
x
u
MWTP −′=
∂
∂
∂
∂
−≡ α
β
 
 
If  then the MWTP is just ijiiji pIpIg −=− )(
i
m
i αβ− . On the other hand, if 
, as would be the case under a Cobb-Douglas specification of 
preferences, then: 
)log() iji pI −=( iji pIg −
 
(6) )( iji
i
m
i
ij pIMWTP −= α
β
 
 
which is increasing with income net of housing costs. 
Given the household’s problem described in equations (2)-(4), household i chooses 
housing choice j if the utility that it receives from this choice exceeds the utility that it receives 
from all other possible house choices, i.e., 
  
                                                 
21 Unobserved heterogeneity is not modeled in this paper because of two reasons.  First, the microdata allow the 
inclusion of a rich set of observed heterogeneity that gives rise to flexible substitution patterns.  Second, additional 
structure would have to be imposed in order to model unobserved heterogeneity. 
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(7) jkWWWWuu ijikikijikikijijikij ≠∀−>−⇒+>+⇒> εεεε   
 
where  includes all of the non-idiosyncratic components of the indirect utility described in 
(2).  As the inequalities in (7) imply, the probability that a household chooses any particular 
choice depends in general on the characteristics of the full set of possible house choices. 
ijW
Assuming ijε  follows an iid extreme value distribution, the probability of household i 
choosing house j from choice set J has the following functional form: 
 
(8) 
∑
=
++−
++−=Π J
j
jijijii
jijijii
ij
xpIg
xpIg
1
))(exp(
))(exp(
ξβα
ξβα
 
 
Maximizing the probability that each household makes the correct housing choice gives 
rise to the following log-likelihood function: 
 
(9)  ∑∑ Π=
i j
ijijL )ln(1
 
where  is an indicator variable equals to one if household i chooses house j and zero 
otherwise.  
ij1
 
B. Endogeneity of Housing Prices 
The main concern that arises in estimating MWTP in the framework of equations (2)-(9) 
comes from the correlation between price and the unobserved portion of the utility.  This 
correlation is caused by omitted variables: the econometrician does not observe all the 
characteristics of the house that affect utility.  In other words, prices tend to be higher for 
houses with valuable unobserved attributes.  Most papers on demand for differentiated products 
have used two methods to solve this problem: the control function approach or the Barry, 
Levinshon and Pakes (1995) method.22  I choose the control function approach because the high 
                                                 
22 Hausman (1978), Heckman (1978) and Smith and Blundell (1986) initially developed the control function, and it 
can be thought of as a two-stage least square approach applied to non-linear models.  In the control function, a set 
of instrumental variables is used in a first stage regression of prices on housing attributes.  In the second stage, a 
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number of products in the housing market leads to complications in estimating mean utilities for 
each product in a Barry, Levinshon and Pakes (1995) framework.  Although both methods have 
slightly different properties – see Petrin and Train (2006) – they both face the same problem of 
finding credible instruments that are correlated with price and uncorrelated with the mean utility 
that all households share from each house. 
The variation in taxation costs faced by homeowners in California is a key element in my 
identification strategy, and I fully exploit the variations in the property tax law when assigning 
property taxes for the chosen and alternative housing choices.  For the chosen houses, the 
property tax is self reported in the Census data.  For the alternative houses, the institutional 
framework of Propositions 13, 60 and 90 is used to generate the taxation costs that a specific 
household faces when choosing that house.  For example, a 54 year old choosing a house from 
the alternative set is assumed to have property taxes calculated as 1% of the house value.  On 
the other hand, homeowners age 55 or older are allowed to transfer current property tax cost of 
their current home to another house if: a) the housing alternative is of equal or lesser value; b) 
the homeowner is moving within the same county or to a county that accepts Proposition 90.  In 
practice, this procedure uses the Regression Discontinuity design framework presented in 
Section III to construct a user cost of the house for the chosen house and alternative homes that 
vary according to the institutional details of Propositions 13, 60 and 90.  This part of the user 
cost of the house corresponds to the “clean” variation in . ijp
With this constructed ijτ%  in hand, I estimate the following first stage for the income 
effects specification, where the sample is a combination of chosen and alternative houses for 
each household: 
 
(10) ( )i ij ij jg I p x ijλτ ψ− = + +% % ν  
 
Then, the predicted residual ijνˆ  is incorporated in the utility function as a linear term: 
 
(11) ˆ( )ij i i ij j i i ij iju g I p xα β γ ν ε= − + + +  
                                                                                                                                                       
function of the first stage predicted residuals is included in the choice model.  In the Barry, Levinshon and Pakes 
(1995), a series of mean utilities derived from market shares are estimated in the choice model.  The mean utilities 
are then regressed on price, housing variables, and the price instrument. 
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 where iγ  also depends on observed household characteristics.  As evident from equation (11), 
the predicted residual ijνˆ  is a proxy for the unobserved housing quality jξ .23 As in traditional 
two-stage least squares estimates, the identification strategy fundamentally relies on the first 
stage results.24 
A potential concern about using ijτ%  as a source of identification is that property taxes of 
the chosen house are correlated with homeowner tenure.  If the property tax component of the 
user cost is correlated with length of stay in the same house, then it is also potentially correlated 
with unobserved housing quality, undermining the identification strategy.  A simple regression of 
current property taxes on tenure produces an R2 of .15.  In order to address this issue, ijτ% is 
modified such that individual tenure is decomposed out of property taxes for the chosen 
house25.  As expected, I find an R2 of only .04 for the regression of ijτ% on homeowner tenure.  I 
use this adjusted ijτ%  throughout the paper. 
While price endogeneity is the main identification problem of revealed preference 
models, it is not the only one.  In order to estimate the model, it is assumed that house 
characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved portion of the utility.  As an example, house 
style or front yard size are assumed to be uncorrelated with number of rooms.  If this is not the 
case, MWTP estimate for an extra room will be biased.  To the best of my knowledge, only 
Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) deal with this issue to estimate valuation of school quality 
within a sorting model using school attendance zone boundaries.  But the inclusion of possible 
different strategies for all estimated parameters is beyond the scope of this research. 
 
                                                 
23 I only include a linear function of the residual in the estimates, although the control function allows the inclusion 
of any non-linear function.  As a consistency check, interactions of the predicted residual with choice variables were 
included in the model, leading to results relatively similar to the original specification. 
24 Since we are including the predicted unobserved component instead of the actual component, standard errors 
were adjusted by the following bootstrap procedure: a) estimate 1000 first stages with bootstrapped user cost 
samples, b) re-estimate the multinomial logit with the new residuals, c) calculate the sample variance of the 
estimated coefficients and add it to the standard errors obtained from the traditional formulas. 
25 The procedure works as follows:  First, the effective property tax rates are estimated for each homeowner.  Then, 
block group average effective tax rates are calculated for homeowners with age groups, such as 30-34, 35-39, 40-44 
year olds, and so on.  Finally, the house value of each homeowner is multiplied by the relevant average effective tax 
rate.  In doing so, the correlation of the instrument with individual homeowner tenure is mitigated, leaving an 
adjusted property tax that is a function of past housing values in the same neighborhood for people of the same age 
group.  Then, property taxes are estimated for the alternative houses using the institutional features of Proposition 
13 and its amendments. 
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V. Estimation Results 
This section presents estimation results for the preceding model, using data on 98,407 
homeowners between 30 and 70 years of age living in the San Francisco Bay Area and included 
in the 15% restricted use 1990 Census sample26.  I use the restricted California Decennial Census 
Long Form data because in addition to containing the location of each house at the block level, 
the Long Form database also includes more complete data on key variables, such as property 
taxes.  In particular, although the public use files of the Census top code property taxes at $5,000 
and report only discrete ranges of taxes, the restricted Long Form data have the exact property 
tax paid by all households up to a $15,000 cap. 
The analysis is restricted to residents of a single metropolitan area for several reasons.  
First, it is a self-contained economic region, with small proportion of commuters in and out of 
the region.  Second, by focusing on a single metropolitan area, I restrict attention to alternative 
housing choices in the same area.  Finally, for reasons of tractability and for obtaining 
permission to use the restricted Census data, it is more convenient to use data from a single 
metropolitan area. 
In the estimation, each household is assumed to compare the value of their current 
house to the value of a set of alternative houses.  I assume that the set of possible alternatives 
includes houses that were newly purchased in the previous year.   This is the best proxy for 
houses available in the market in the year of analysis. 27  For each household in the estimation 
sample, I randomly assign 10 alternative houses from the choice set - the consistency of this 
procedure is guaranteed by the IIA property, as demonstrated in McFadden (1978). 28 
The choice variables include characteristics of the house (draw from the Census data), 
socio-demographic characteristics of the neighborhood (based on averages at the block group 
level from the Census data), and characteristics of the neighborhood from external data, 
including elevation, population density, a measure of local air quality and a measure of 1st grade 
test scores in the nearest public primary school.29  Appendix Table 1 shows the average 
                                                 
26 The sample is composed of six counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Jose, Santa Clara and San Francisco. 
27 Misspecification of the choice set may lead to serious estimation biases.  Swait (1984) showed, for example, that 
not incorporating captivity to a certain group of alternatives, lead to downward biased estimates for choice 
characteristics and upward biased fixed effects parameters. The logic is simple: when we include in the model 
alternatives not available to individuals (or not considered by them), we are in fact adding extra noise, which will be 
captured by the fixed effects, reducing the importance of observed choice variables. 
28  Although IIA property dictates substitution patterns among individual alternatives, the inclusion of observed 
heterogeneity allows flexible substitution patters at higher levels of aggregation. 
29 Elevation is measured at the block level (source: EPA: BASINS - Better Assessment Science Integrating Point 
and Nonpoint Sources).  Population density combines Census data and block group areas drawn from ArcView 
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characteristics of the houses owned by people in the sample and of the alternative houses.  The 
alternative houses have a smaller number of rooms, were built more recently and are more likely 
to be apartments or attached dwellings.  Neighborhood characteristics are very similar for both 
groups, although chosen houses are located in slightly whiter and richer block groups. 
After generating property taxes for all housing alternatives using the institutional features 
of Propositions 13, 60 and 90, the individual user cost of the house is constructed as in equation 
8, using an interest rate of 6%.30  Columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Table 2 report the first stage 
estimates of the user cost on property taxes and housing and neighborhood variables for the 
pooled set of houses and alternatives.  As expected, all specifications show a high F-test for the 
instrumental variable. 
Multinomial logit estimates are presented in Table 4.  Column (1) shows preference 
parameters for a model without heterogeneity and assuming that utility is linear in income net of 
housing costs.  I focus on four variables – two housing features: number of rooms and detached 
houses; and two neighborhood characteristics: average neighborhood income and percentage 
white in a block group – to compare how changes in the model affect MWTP estimates.  All 
signs look correct – negative for price and positive for the choice variables.  The main problem 
is the magnitude of the price coefficient, which suggests a very small value for the marginal 
utility of income, or alternatively very high value of willingness to pay.  This problem, which has 
been noted in other studies, is arguably due to the fact that house prices are correlated with 
unobserved characteristics of the house.  Looking at column (2), the estimated coefficient of the 
user cost variable remains relatively small in magnitude, even when including a broad set of 
housing and neighborhood controls. 
Column (3) reports the estimate results for a specification similar to the one in column 
(2) but with the addition of a control function, equal to the residual of the first stage model for 
the user costs, as indicated in equations (10) and (11).  The coefficient on the control function is 
large and positive, suggesting that unobserved variables that affect price also affect the utility 
assigned to the house.  When the control function is included, the coefficient on the user cost 
rises in magnitude by a factor of 3. 
                                                                                                                                                       
GIS.  Average test scores of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993 academic years are assigned from the closest school within 
the school district, using census block centroids and school latitudes and longitudes (source: California Department 
of Education, 1991-1993).  Air quality is predicted for each census block using information from monitor stations 
(source: Rand California, 1990) and industrial plants (source: EPA – AIRS –Aerometric Information Retrieval 
System). 
30 Similar results were achieved with interest rates of 8% and 10%. 
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MWTP estimates derived from the primitives of the model are shown in Table 5.  The 
simplest model in column (1) shows very high MWTP estimates for those amenities: $3,372 per 
year for an extra room, $19,797 for a detached house, $960 for a $10,000 higher average income 
of the neighborhood, and $3,274 a marginal increase in the percentage white.  Even after 
including other controls for housing and neighborhood amenities in column (2), the results still 
look very similar.  Column (3) shows the inclusion of the control function.  As noted in the 
multinomial logit estimates, the control function has the expected effect of deflating the MWTP 
estimates: $2,151 for number of rooms, $5,188 for a detached house, a surprisingly similar 
estimate for average income, and only $1,562 for percentage white.31 
Wealth effects are included in columns (4) and (5) of Tables 4 and 5.  Again, the results 
are meaningful only after controlling for the unobserved housing quality.  The user cost 
coefficient sign is opposed to the initial estimates because it was replaced by the income net of 
housing costs.  As expected, the MWTP estimates are usually higher for all variables when the 
model includes wealth effects.  Homeowners are on average willing to pay a similar amount for 
an extra room, but 45% more for a detached house, 30% more for a higher average income, and 
18% more for additional whites in the neighborhood. 
Finally, Table 6 reports parameter estimates for a model that includes observed 
heterogeneity.  Household income, age, and a dummy for white are interacted with all choice 
characteristics, including distance to work.  Column (1) shows baseline MWTP estimates, 
corresponding to a mixed race household (given by the share of whites in the sample) with 
average income and average age.  Although the baseline estimates are not comparable to the 
results from the homogeneous model on Table 5, they are reasonably similar.  Columns (2), (3) 
and (4) report MWTP results from a household with higher income, higher age, and white 
respectively.  The $10,000 change in income is not enough to have a noticeable effect in 
preferences.  10 years of age has a sizable effect though, especially on the choice of housing type.  
Finally, white households have very strong preferences to live with individuals of the same type. 
In order to assure that estimation results are driven by the variation in the data, and not 
by the structure of the model, I also estimate a similar housing choice model for Dallas-TX in 
                                                 
31 Appendix Table 2, Column (1) reports results for a standard hedonic regression model.  Although the hedonic 
model is not purged of any of the selection and endogeneity problems, it offers a good benchmark for comparing 
the model estimates. 
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1990.32  Table 7 shows the multinomial logit estimates for models with and without the control 
function.  The standard multinomial logit showed in column (1) has a small and negative user 
cost coefficient, as we observed for the California estimates.  However, the results are very 
different for the control function specification shown in column (2).  The control function 
coefficient estimate is not significantly different from zero, and its magnitude is very small 
(0.029) and not powerful enough to shift the user cost coefficient.  MWTP estimates are 
reported in columns (3) and (4), and they show very similar results for both approaches, 
indicating that the control function does not provide new relevant variation to the estimates.  
Given that house values in Texas are re-assessed every two to three years, moving costs 
represented by property taxes do not carry any information about historical house prices, and 
potential house buyers have similar user costs for the same property in that state. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Given that homeownership is the primary way in which families accumulate wealth, 
understanding housing demand is of special importance in evaluating questions of welfare and 
equity across household types.  Unfortunately, existing economic models that predict sorting in 
the urban landscape generally assume no barriers to household sorting due to transaction costs.  
In reality, it is hardly credible to assume that such frictions do not affect the housing market. 
In this paper I provided clear evidence that transaction costs affect individual behavior.  
Using a natural experiment design generated by California’s Propositions 13, 60 and 90, I show a 
distinct effect of property tax variations on household mobility.  This analysis also indicates that 
individuals may face differentiated prices in the market, and that such variation can be used as a 
source of identification for revealed preference models of housing demand.  MWTP for housing 
characteristics are approximately 100% upward biased when the variation in property taxes is not 
used to account for the endogeneity of housing prices. 
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Figure 1. Effective property tax rates by homeowner age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Effective property tax rates are calculated as property taxes divided by house 
values. Age is the maximum between age of the head of the house and spouse. 
 
 
Figure 2. Property taxes/household income ratio by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Counterfactual ratios are calculated as 1% of house values divided by household 
income.  Age is the maximum between age of the head of the house and spouse. 
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Figure 3. Probability of moving for homeowners by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the probability of moving for homeowners by age, calculated 
as the number of new movers in 1989-1990 divided by the total number of homeowners by age.  Age is the 
maximum between age of the head of the house and spouse.  The thick line is composed by predicted values of a 
polynomial regression of probability of moving on a dummy for 55-year, age, age squared and cubic, household 
characteristics and housing amenities. 
 
Figure 4. Other covariates by age, California 1990 
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
36 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
age
number of rooms % white household income
no
rm
al
iz
ed
 a
ve
ra
ge
s
 
Source: 1990 IPUMS.  Notes: Each dot represents the average normalized covariate by each age group.  The 
thick line is composed by predicted values of a polynomial regression of probability of moving on a dummy for 
55-year, age, age squared and cubic, household characteristics and housing amenities. 
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Figure 5. Probability of moving for homeowners by age, California 1980. 
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Source: 1980 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the probability of moving for homeowners by age, 
calculated as the number of new movers in 1979-1980 divided by the total number of homeowners by age.  
The thick line is composed by predicted values of a polynomial regression of probability of moving on a 
dummy for 55-year, age, age squared and cubic, household characteristics and housing amenities. 
 
 
Figure 6. Probability of moving for renters by age, California 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the probability of moving for renters by age, calculated as 
the number of new renters in 1989-1990 divided by the total number of renters by age.  The thick line is 
composed by predicted values of a polynomial regression of probability of moving on a dummy for 55-year, 
age, age squared and cubic, household characteristics and housing amenities. 
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Figure 7. Probability of moving for homeowners by age, Texas 1990. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Each dot represents the probability of moving for homeowners by age, 
calculated as the number of new movers in 1989-1990 divided by the total number of homeowners by age.  
The thick line is composed by predicted values of a polynomial regression of probability of moving on a 
dummy for 55-year, age, age squared and cubic, household characteristics and housing amenities. 
 
 
Figure 8. Average property taxes for recent movers by age, California and Texas, 1990 and 1980. 
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Source: 1990 IPUMS.  Notes: Each dot represents the average property taxes faced by each age group.  The 
thick line is composed by predicted values of a polynomial regression of average property taxes on a dummy 
for 55-year, age, age squared and cubic, household characteristics and housing amenities. 
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Figure 9. Probability of moving by tax benefit transfer status, California 1990. 
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Notes: The group of homeowners allowed to transfer the tax benefit is made by those homeowners who moved 
in 1989-1990 within the same county, or to a different county that approved  Proposition 90.  Each dot 
represents the average mobility rate by year faced by each group.  The thick line is composed by predicted values 
of a polynomial regression of probability of moving on a dummy for 55-year, age, age squared and cubic, 
household characteristics and housing amenities. 
 
 
Table 1. House Values and Property Taxes by When Moved Into a House, California and Texas 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
California, 1990
house value 215042 210820 219730 214524 219431 215399 194380
property tax 1179 1666 1672 1411 866 616 541
effective tax rate 0.58% 0.80% 0.78% 0.70% 0.44% 0.34% 0.34%
California, 1980
house value 97151 105824 103473 101039 94977 83857 74627
property tax 774 931 950 738 681 586 517
effective tax rate 0.85% 0.92% 0.96% 0.79% 0.78% 0.78% 0.80%
Texas, 1990
house value 74669 79589 83686 78008 72734 67323 56559
property tax 950 1080 1168 1024 928 757 475
effective tax rate 1.39% 1.50% 1.49% 1.43% 1.40% 1.27% 1.06%
Texas, 1980
house value 51391 61642 60753 52337 46174 38442 30679
property tax 704 814 888 726 617 476 307
effective tax rate 1.44% 1.39% 1.52% 1.48% 1.44% 1.34% 1.14%
moved in 11-
20 years ago
moved in 21-
30 years ago
moved in 30 
or more 
years ago
full sample moved in 1 year ago
moved in 2-
5 years ago
moved in 6-
10 years ago
 
Source: 1990 and 1980 IPUMS. Notes: Household data include all 18-year or older head of the house homeowners, with non-zero property tax 
payments. Households with allocations for 'when moved in' and 'property taxes' are not included. Households living in another state 5  years 
prior to the relevant year of moving are also excluded. Half of the 1980 sample was not included because the Census Bureau did not process the 
mobility variables for a random sample of half of the population, in order to reduce costs of processing information. 
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Table 2. RDD Estimates of the Effect of Propositions 60 and 90 on Mobility 
pooling pooling excluding 54
TX, 1990  CA, 1980 to 55-year olds
dependent variable: 1 if moved (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if age>=55 -0.084 0.015 0.015 -0.003 -0.004 0.014
-0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003
age -0.024 -0.023 -0.022 -0.029 -0.021
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004
1 if California X 1 if age>=55 0.017
-0.005
1 if 1990 X 1 if age>=55 0.020
-0.006
age controls (squared and cubic) N Y Y Y Y Y
housing and neighborhood controls N N Y Y Y Y
metropolitan area dummies N N Y N N Y
state fixed effects N N N Y N N
year fixed effects N N N N Y N
sample size 233514 233514 233514 381069 308059 225411
California, 1990
 
Source: 1980 and 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Table shows maximum likelihood probit estimates (and standard errors) of the effect of age on the 
probability of moving to a new house in 1989-1990, evaluating the marginal effect at the mean. Age is the maximum between age of the head of 
the house and spouse. House characteristics include number of rooms and house value. Household characteristics include income, race, and 
education. Standard error estimates are based on the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and they are also clustered by age. 
 
 
Table 3. RDD Estimates of the Effect of Propositions 60 and 90 on Property Taxes 
Long Tenure Recent Recent
Homeowners Movers Movers
CA, 1990 TX, 1990 CA, 1980
dependent variable: property taxes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 if age>=55 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.00
-0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.03
age -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01
-0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01
age controls (squared and cubic) N Y Y Y Y Y
housing and neighborhood controls N Y Y Y Y Y
metropolitan area dummies N N Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.005 0.008 0.014 0.058 0.0535 0.018
sample size 19854 19854 19854 112705 9118 7220
Recent Movers in California, 1990
 
Source: 1980 and 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Table shows estimates (and standard errors) of a linear regression model of the effect of age on effective 
property tax rates for recent movers. Households who were living in another state 5 years prior to the relevant year of moving were excluded. 
Standard error estimates are based on the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and they are also clustered by age. Estimates are 
presented in percentage points. 
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Table 4. Household Location Decision Model: Raw Preferences, California, 1990 
simple including
logit covariates logit control function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
user cost -0.480 -0.797 -2.476 0.335 13.150
0.005 0.010 0.017 0.009 0.065
number of rooms 0.297 0.556 0.979 0.367 0.878
0.005 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009
1 if detached house 0.375 0.394 0.507 0.251 0.688
0.004 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.011
avg neighborhood income (/10K) 0.147 0.276 0.856 -0.015 1.053
0.005 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.011
% white 0.037 0.056 0.092 -0.112 0.101
0.004 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.010
control function 1.693 12.743
0.007 0.062
housing and neighborhood controls N Y Y Y Y
sample size 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407
control 
function
wealth effects
 
Source: US Census Bureau - 1990 California Decennial Census Long Form data. Notes: Table shows multinomial logit estimates (and standard 
errors ) of the household location decision model. Other house variables include: built in 1985-1989, built in 1980-1984, and built in 1970-1979. 
Other neighborhood controls include: block group percentage white, density, elevation, air quality, and first grade test scores.  Standard errors are 
bootstrapped, as reported in the text. 
 
 
Table 5. Household Location Decision Model: MWTP Estimates, California, 1990 
simple all
logit variables logit control function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 extra room 3,372 3,791 2,151 33,701 2,052
(67) (75) (32) (1107) (24)
detached house 19,797 12,515 5,188 107,133 7,484
(333) (364) (117) (5083) (121)
avg neighborhood income (/10K) 960 1,081 1,082 -793 1,415
(32) (36) (27) (391) (16)
% white 3,274 2,985 1,562 -80,005 1,835
(373) (456) (180) (6633) (175)
housing and neighborhood controls N Y Y Y Y
average user cost 20035 20035 20035 20035 20035
sample size 98407 98407 98407 98407 98407
control function wealth effects
 
Source: US Census Bureau - 1990 California Decennial Census Long Form data. Notes: Table shows MWTP estimates (and standard errors ) 
derived from Table 4. Standard errors were calculated using the delta method. MWTP estimates for the wealth effects were adjusted to the 
average user cost of the house. 
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Table 6. Household Location Decision Model: Heterogeneity in MWTP Estimates, California, 1990 
Income Age White
(+$10,000) (+10 years) (vs other races)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1 extra room 1,783 1,832 1,801 1,826
(49) (53) (52) (54)
detached house 3,509 3,468 2,339 3,243
(140) (141) (95) (138)
avg neighborhood income (/10K) 1,532 1,574 1,426 1,523
(36) (38) (35) (37)
%white 2,560 2,590 2,180 4,690
(280) (290) (260) (490)
housing and neighborhood controls Y Y Y Y
average user cost 20035 20035 20035 20035
sample size 98407 98407 98407 98407
MWTP
Baseline
 
Source: US Census Bureau - 1990 California Decennial Census Long Form data. Notes: Table shows MWTP estimates (and standard errors ) 
derived from a multionomial logit model that includes heterogeneity, ie., all choice variables were interacted with individual income, a dummy for 
white, age and distance to work. The baseline estimates correspond to a mixed race household with average income and average age.  Columns 
(2) to (4) report willingness to pay associated with a household listed in the column heading, holding all other factors equal. Other house 
variables include: built in 1985-1989, built in 1980-1984, and built in 1970-1979. Other neighborhood controls include: block group percentage 
white, density, elevation, air quality, and first grade test scores. Standard errors were calculated using the delta method. 
 
Table 7. Household Location Decision Model: Raw Preferences and MWTP Estimates, Texas, 1990 
simple control simple control
logit function logit function
(1) (2) (3) (4)
user cost -0.155 -0.181
0.016 0.021
1 extra room 0.078 0.093 2,097 2,137
0.014 0.016 (431) (447)
detached house 0.066 0.066 10,658 9,216
0.011 0.011 (2135) (1911)
avg neighborhood income (/10K) -0.076 -0.071 -3,333 -2,665
0.014 0.014 (705) (625)
% white 0.018 0.019 5415 4950
0.013 0.013 (3909) (3384)
control function 0.029
0.015
housing and neighborhood controls Y Y Y Y
average user cost 9103 9103
sample size 11083 11083 11083 11083
MWTPRaw Preferences
 
Source: 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Table shows multinomial logit estimates (and standard errors ) of the household location decision model. Other 
house variables include: built in 1985-1989, built in 1980-1984, and built in 1970-1979. Other neighborhood controls include: neighborhood 
percentage white. Standard errors for the control function approach are adjusted by the following bootstrap procedure: a) estimate 1000 first 
stages with bootstrapped user cost samples, b) re-estimate the multinomial logit with the new residuals, c) calculate the sample variance of the 
estimated coeffcients and add it to the standard errors obtained from the traditional formulas. 
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Appendix Table 1. Average Household Characteristics, California 1990 
30 to 70-year old
homeowners
(1) (2)
house value 306984 301609
number of rooms 6.31 5.92
1 if detached 0.85 0.72
1 if built in 1985-89 0.08 0.27
1 if built in 1980-84 0.07 0.09
1 if built in 1970-79 0.20 0.20
block group average income 64546 63941
block group % white 0.73 0.72
elevation 248.00 250.00
1st grade test scores 545.00 541.00
population density 0.28 0.27
air quality index 23.29 23.47
sample size 98407 8347
choice set
 
Source: US Census Bureau - 1990 California Decennial Census Long Form data and 1990 IPUMS. Notes: Average 
income, percentage white, and density are constructed at the block group level. Elevation is measured at the block level 
(source: EPA: BASINS). Test scores are assigned from the closest school within the school district (source: California 
Department of Education, 1991-1993). Air quality is predicted for each census block using information from monitor 
stations (source: Rand California, 1990) and industrial plants (source: EPA – AIRS –Aerometric Information Retrieval 
System, 1990). 
 
Appendix Table 2. Hedonic Regression and First Stage Estimates, California and Texas, 1990 
California Texas
hedonic control wealth control
regression function effect function
dependent variable: user cost (1) (2) (3) (4)
adjusted property taxes 4.0 -0.0003 4.1
(0.004) (0.000003) (0.03)
number of rooms 1,549 792 -0.022 605
(13) (3) (0.003) (21)
1 if detached house 2,434 1,916 -0.146 -115
(60) (14) (0.011) (108)
avg neighborhood income (/10K) 1,327 599 -0.032 685
(9) (3) (0.002) (35)
% white 4843 1657 -0.126 -1545
(115) (31) (0.024) (220)
housing and neighborhood controls Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.57 0.84 0.04 0.77  
Source: US Census Bureau - 1990 California Decennial Census Long Form data. Notes: Table shows multiple regression estimates of the user 
cost of the house on the instrumental variable and other housing and neighborhood characteristics. Other house variables include: built in 1985-
1989, built in 1980-1984, and built in 1970-1979. Other neighborhood controls include: block group percentage white, density, elevation, air 
quality, and first grade test scores. 
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